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THE COMPATIBILITY OF MATERIALISM AND 
SURVIVAL: THE "FALLING ELEVATOR" MODEL 
Dean W. Zimmerman 
It is not easy to be a materialist and yet believe that there is a way for human 
beings to survive death. Peter van Inwagen identifies the central obstacle the 
materialist faces: Namely, the need to posit appropriate "immanent-causal" 
connections between my body as it is at death and some living body elsewhere 
or elsewhen. I offer a proposal, consistent with van Inwagen's own materialist 
metaphysics, for making materialism compatible with the possibility of survival. 
1. Introduction: Peter van Inwagen's problem for materialist survival 
Suppose that the materialist is right about me: I am a physical object, name-
ly the living human body sitting here at my desk. Now consider the fact 
that this particular physical object would appear to be doomed. It will suf-
fer decay, cease to exist, its parts probably ending up spread all around the 
world. Do not these two suppositions together imply that I am doomed? 
That I will suffer decay and cease to exist? If I and the body in question are 
not two things but one, then whatever fate awaits my body awaits me. 
The Christian - at least the Christian who affirms, say, the Nicene 
creed - is one who "looks for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of 
the world to come." Can such a one be a materialist? Can she accept the 
conclusion of the preceding argument, judging that she will suffer decay 
and cease to exist - for a time, until "the life of the world to come" begins? 
Well, why not? What is supposed to be the big problem about ceasing 
to exist for a time and then coming back into existence again? Perhaps, at 
the general resurrection, God collects all the parts of me that are left (or 
some portion of them if a few have found their way into other people's 
bodies to be resurrected with them) and reconstitutes me more or less as I 
was at my death. Isn't that enough to bring me back onto the scene? 
The primary problem with this and similar scenarios is not that there 
are obvious objections to the possibility of "gappy existence". Locke's 
principle, that nothing could have two beginnings of existence, is trivially 
true if taken to mean that nothing could have two earliest moments at 
which it exists; but it is not at all obvious if taken to rule out the possibility 
of something's ceasing to be for a time and then coming back into existence 
again. The real problem is that it is hard to see how a living body could 
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come back into existence after this sort of temporal gap. For the gap 
described is one over which there appear to be no causal connections - or 
at least no very direct ones - passing from the body as it was at death to 
the body as it will be in the world to come. For God to create a "new me" 
at that late date - even if He uses mostly old parts salvaged from the 
wreck of my body - is not for Him to bring me back, but to create a mere 
replica of me, a doppelganger. 
Peter van Inwagen makes the point succinctly and forcefully: 
The atoms of which I am composed occupy at each instant the posi-
tions they do because of the operations of certain processes within me 
(those processes that, taken collectively, constitute my being alive) . 
... [I]f a man does not simply die but is totally destroyed (as in the 
case of cremation) then he can never be reconstituted, for the causal 
chain has been irrevocably broken. If God collects the atoms that 
used to constitute that man and "reassembles" them, they will occu-
py the positions relative to one another they occupy because of God's 
miracle and not because of the operation of the natural processes that, 
taken collectively, were the life of that man.! 
I find van lnwagen's basic contention extremely plausible. In order that 
a given material object - or any other individual thing, for that matter -
persist throughout a period of time, there must be appropriate causal rela-
tions between the object as it is at earlier times and the object as it is at later 
times. Exactly what relations are "appropriate" is, of course, a vexed ques-
tion. But most metaphysicians seem to agree with van Tnwagen that there 
must be a causal element in any adequate "criterion of identity" for persist-
ing material objects.2 Later states of a persisting body must be causally 
dependent, at least in part, upon its earlier states. 
But not just any sort of causal dependence seems sufficient to give us 
the kinds of causal relations that are crucial to the persistence of a living 
body. It is not enough, says van lnwagen, that the way my body was at 
death serve as a mere blueprint for God's creation of a new one at the gen-
eral resurrection. That is causal contribution of a sort; but here the causal 
chain passes through God's mind; it doesn't remain at all times "imma-
nent" with respect to processes going on inside a living human body. The 
case is analogous to that of van Inwagen's monks who claim that God 
"recreated" an original manuscript in Augustine's own hand.3 If the origi-
nal was destroyed in a fire, no document brought into existence later on, 
by God or anyone else, could literally be the original- no matter how pre-
cisely similar the two might be. 
Does the Christian materialist have any options left? It might seem that 
she has none, that she is forced either (a) to deny van Inwagen's thesis 
about the necessity of direct causal dependencies of the appropriate, 
"immanent" sort for her persistence, or (b) to deny that she is identical 
with her body. But I think there are options left - as does van Inwagen.4 
Abstractly, the only other way out is to deny the second, empirical premise 
in the problem as I stated it in the first paragraph: Namely, the premise 
asserting that this body is doomed. Perhaps my body's future is really not 
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so grim; perhaps, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, my 
upcoming death is not, strictly speaking, the complete and utter destruc-
tion of my body after all. 
Van Inwagen has suggested one way in which this body could have a 
brighter future than at first appears: Granted, it seems as if the organic life 
of my body peters out, and appropriate causal paths end. If this were what 
really happens, then (van Inwagen insists) setting up some batch of sim-
ples later on in such a way that they are alive and constitute an organism 
resembling me as I was at death would just be starting up a new life, one 
that is lived by a new organism. But perhaps appearances are deceiving; 
perhaps God secures my survival by surreptitiously removing my corpse 
- or at least my brain and central nervous system - and replacing it with 
a simulacrum at the time of my (seeming) death. At one time, van 
Inwagen thought this was the only way (consistent with empirical facts) 
for God to effect my survival.5 
But the Christian materialist would surely do well to look for a better 
story than this. I once helped a friend with some of the more laborious 
steps in the process of taking a human corpse apart. 6 Opening a human 
skull and finding a dead brain is sort of like opening the ground and find-
ing a dinosaur skeleton. Of course it is in some sense possible that God 
takes our brains when we die and replaces them with stuff that looks for all 
the world like dead brains, just as it is possible that God created the world 
6000 years ago and put dinosaur bones in the ground to test our faith in a 
slavishly literal reading of Genesis. But neither is particularly satisfying as 
a picture of how God actually does business. 
And that provides the motivation for this paper: My goal here is to tell a 
better "just so" story (consistent with van Inwagen's version of materialism) 
according to which God insures that this very body escapes the deadly 
powers that would otherwise destroy it - and does so without "body-
snatching" (that is, without spiriting away any of my body's parts and leav-
ing behind different matter so that the miracle goes unnoticed). The escape 
is by a hair's breadth, effected by a miraculous last minute "jump" that 
takes me out of harm's way. So I am tempted to call this story "the falling 
elevator model of survival" - for you'll recall that, according to the 
"physics" of cartoons, it is possible to avoid death in a plummeting elevator 
simply by jumping out in the split second before the elevator hits the base-
ment floor. I argue that it is consistent with the rest of van Inwagen's mate-
rialistic metaphysics that our bodies do something like that when we die. 
And we needn't add anything too wildly implausible in order to allow 
for this possibility - at least, nothing implausible that isn't already present 
in or required by van Inwagen's materialism. To establish this last point, I 
shall have to discuss problems of fission at some length. The goal will be 
to show that a materialism such as van Inwagen's cannot avoid a "closest 
continuer" account of the persistence conditions for persons - that is, van 
Inwagen must deny what is sometimes called "the only x and y principle." 
This is important, since the falling elevator model requires that human per-
sistence conditions include a "temporally closest continuer" clause. Some 
will insist that adopting a closest continuer theory of personal identity is 
just as wildly implausible as supposing that God is a body-snatcher - and, 
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for the record, I am inclined to agree. But, however that may be, T show 
that a closest continuer account of personal identity is an inevitable corol-
lary of van Inwagen-style materialism. 
Although van Inwagen's materialism provides the context in which I 
develop the falling elevator model of entry into the next life, I am confident 
that my strategy could be deployed within other theories of persistence, as 
long as they give pride of place to a causal element in criteria of identity 
over time. In particular, those who, unlike van Inwagen, accept the thesis 
that a human being persists by having a different "temporal part" for each 
time at which she exists will have a somewhat easier time of it. I choose 
van Inwagen's own metaphysics because he has set the problem for us, 
and because his theory of persisting living things is probably one of the 
hardest to square with survival. 
Finally, although I tell the story under the supposition of materialism, it 
remains of some relevance for any substance dualist, like myself, who 
would like to be able to say that it is this very body which will be reunited 
with my immaterial soul at the" general resurrection." 
2. Van Inwagen's metaphysics of material beings 
Van Inwagen's account of the nature and persistence conditions of physi-
cal objects is found in his impressive book, Material Beings.7 Here's the 
Reader's Digest condensed version: At bottom, the universe is filled with 
material simples - tiny particles that have no proper parts. Some of them 
are arranged table-wise in the center of my study; many more are arranged 
house-wise around me. However, contrary to what one might initially have 
thought, the simples arranged in a table shape here do not in fact compose 
anything, nor do the ceiling-shaped simples hanging over me. Simply 
heaping simples together is not sufficient to produce an object having them 
for its parts. Some simples, however, are caught up into a very special kind 
of event: namely, a Life. A set of objects are caught up in a Life when they 
are organized in such a way that they work toward insuring the continued 
existence of successor sets of simples organized in roughly the way they are 
- they possess a conatus sese conservandi, a knack for self-maintenance. The 
only events in our world that really exhibit this sort of self-sustaining activi-
ty are biological (although a particularly stable weather pattern, like a hurri-
cane, is at least a pale imitation of a Life). When a set of objects are caught 
up in a Life, then there exists an object that is composed of these parts - a 
living organism. This organism lasts just so long as the event which is its 
Life continues. And, since there is no other way of organizing a collection 
of objects so that they compose an object, the world contains nothing but 
living things and the simples from which they are made. 
Self-maintenance, the hallmark of Lives, is an intrinsically causal notion. 
And it requires a kind of "immanent causation". If matter is organized in 
one of the ways characteristic of living things, it tends to directly bring it 
about that there be matter organized in roughly the same way. A process 
that only indirectly insures that a certain sort of structure be maintained 
will not count as a single Life. For instance, a process whereby I have off-
spring, even offspring as like me as a clone, will not count as a single Life, 
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since it is, for a time, not an event happening to any living human organ-
ism. A process may preserve my body's structure but it won't be a single 
Life if, for example, it passes through the banks of a Star Trek-style tele-
porter or a blueprint in the mind of God. Such processes are not instances 
of true self-maintenance. Clearly, it is this component of van lnwagen's 
metaphysics that makes the possibility of survival so problematic. Since 
my Life is necessarily a self-perpetuating event, the apparently complete 
failure of my body to perpetuate itself at my death would seem to assure 
its demise; once the living structure has been completely lost, say in crema-
tion, an attempt by God or anything else to bring my parts back together to 
form a living thing cannot possibly result in the continuation of my Life. 
How does van Tnwagen's materialism handle the familiar problems of 
fission and fusion? What is to be said, for instance, about a Life that splits 
when a human organism divides in two by means of some fancy brain-
splitting surgery? Here I think van Inwagen, like all materialists save cer-
tain temporal parts theorists, must give up what is sometimes called the 
"only x and y principle": roughly, the thesis that facts about events outside 
the spatiotemporal path swept out by an object could not have made any 
difference to the question of whether or not a single object passed along 
that path.' Van Inwagen must allow for at least the abstract possibility of 
cases of organic fission which break the only x and y principle. Although 
this will take some showing, it is important that I do so. For the falling ele-
vator model of survival implies that the (antecedently highly plausible) 
only x and y principle be false. If van Inwagen's materialism should force 
him to reject the principle anyway, the falling elevator model does not 
have this implication as an added cost. 
We know that it is possible for a person to survive the removal of an 
entire brain hemisphere. And it seems plausible to suppose that "brain 
transplants" are at least possible in principle, and that in such a case the 
person goes where her brain goes. Now if my brain were only a little bit 
different," then it would seem that I could survive not just the loss of an 
entire hemisphere, but the destruction of an entire half of my brain; and, 
given the possibility of brain transplants, the subsequent transplantation of 
my remaining half-a-brain into a different body. But this raises a familiar, 
troublesome question: What would happen were my (supposedly) sym-
metrical brain split in two, each of the halves being transplanted into a sep-
arate body? Each of the resulting organisms would have an equally good 
claim to be continuing my Life - that is, to be me. But they cannot both be 
me; one thing cannot become two, on pain of contradiction. Now the 
believer in souls can say that I went wherever my soul went - either with 
the one half-brain or the other or neither, as the case may be.1O But what 
should the materialist say? 
Those who believe in temporal parts can maintain that there were two 
people all along; they simply shared their earlier stages, much as two roads 
may share a certain stretch of pavement in common. But the opponents of 
temporal parts, such as van Inwagen himself, must say something else -
namely, that, at least in cases of perfectly symmetrical fission, the original 
organism ceases to be and is replaced by two new ones. And indeed that is 
what van Inwagen does sayY But, as shall become apparent, this response 
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leads inevitably to a "closest continuer" theory of personal identity: the 
view that whether a given process is a single Life will sometimes depend 
upon events that are not part of that process. 
Here is what van lnwagen actually says about fissioning Lives. First, he 
sets up a "best case scenario" for fission. Imagine an intelligent but amoe-
ba-like creature - call it "Neocerberus" - with two "brains" correspond-
ing rather closely to our two hemispheres. Each brain is the seat of reason-
ing, of the processing of sensory information, and of Neocerberus's other 
"higher" mental functions. One thing these brains don't do is direct any of 
the homeodynamic activities of the body - they exercise no control over 
metabolism, antisepsis, respiration, pulse rate, and so on. These activities 
are governed by two "organs of maintenance," similarly paired. Like our 
two hemispheres, the two brains send messages back and forth by means 
of a commisure; and the two organs of maintenance are similarly linked. 
But unlike our hemispheres, which only imperfectly mirror one another's 
activity, the two brains are practically mirror images of one another, and 
likewise for the two organs of maintenance. Each works with its partner to 
stay in roughly the same state, so that each sends out the same signals to 
the rest of the amoeba-like body. Consequently, both conscious bodily 
movements and unconscious regulation of homeodynamic processes are 
overdetermined - each brain and each organ of maintenance sends a mes-
sage which would have been sufficient by itself to bring about the bodily 
change in question. 
Van Inwagen allows that the activities of Neocerberus's brains, organs 
of maintenance, and other parts, constitute a single life; Neocerberus is a 
living, thinking individual, while its left half and its right half are not. 
Given the substantial doubling up of functions in our own twin hemi-
spheres, it would be a dangerous thing to deny the possibility of there 
being an individual like Neocerberus. But then van Inwagen must face the 
following question: 
[Sjuppose we surgically divide Neocerberus right down the middle. 
We suppose that his vital organs - pumps, glands, and so on - are 
symmetrically distributed, and that lesions in Neocerberus' outer 
integument heal almost instantly. When this is done, we shall obvi-
ously have two organisms. What is their relation to Neocerberus? 
You [i.e., van Inwagenl, I think, must say that neither is Neocerberus. 
You must hold that two new organisms have come into existence, 
and that Neocerberus ceased to exist at the moment it became true 
that the simples that had composed him began to compose two 
organisms. Call the two new organisms Alpha and Beta. Brain 1 is a 
part of Alpha ... and brain 2 is a part of Beta.12 
And van Inwagen accepts this conclusion: fission would mean the 
death of Neocerberus; its Life is over, and two new Lives begin. 
Does this automatically make van lnwagen a closest continuer theorist, a 
denier of the only x and y principle? Not necessarily. For he could say that, 
even if brain 2 and its corresponding organ of maintenance had been simply 
"removed by destruction," as it were, that would have ended Neocerberus's 
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life. He could then claim that it is not the mere presence of a competitor that 
keeps Neocerberus's Life from following the spatiotemporal path traced out 
by Alpha (or Beta). And this is just what van Inwagen does say. 
So what is so bad about the removal by destruction of Neocerberus's 
right or left half? Why could it not survive such a loss? The event which 
Neocerberus could not survive is not, on van Inwagen's view, the loss of 
one of the brains. That, he thinks, is perfectly possible - just as we humans 
can survive the loss of a hemisphere. What Neocerberus cannot survive is 
the loss of one of the organs of maintenance. Destroy one, or separate the 
two, and Neocerberus dies. 
But why would the destruction of one of these organs automatically 
"kill" Neocerberus? After all, the rest of the organism could get along just 
fine without it, since all its signals are duplicated by the other organ. 
Destruction of the Beta organ of maintenance, says van Inwagen, "ends 
Neocerberus' life because it destroys one of the two 'organs of maintenance' 
that had been directing that life. The resulting life is a new event, distinct 
from Neocerberus' life because it had different causes from Neocerberus' 
life. It is in fact Alpha's life, and the resulting organism is ... Alpha. "13 
This strategy for avoiding the closest continuer theory ceases to be feasi-
ble, however, as soon as a broader range of possible organisms is considered. 
Take Leftycerberus, for example, an organism only slightly different from 
Neocerberus. Both of its organs of maintenance are more or less in synch, 
but the left one is a little faster than the right in sending electrical impulses to 
the rest of the body; and the first signal to arrive always preempts the slower 
signal, preventing it from causing changes in respiration, pulse rate, and so 
on. In this case, the right-hand organ of maintenance isn't among the causes 
of Leftycerberus's Life; and so, according to van Inwagen's reasoning, it can 
be removed without bringing Leftycerberus's Life to an end. But let's tinker 
a bit with Leftycerberus. What if its right organ were sometimes successful 
and sometimes not? What if, for each electrical impulse sent, there were a 
fifty-fifty chance that the one and not the other would succeed? Perhaps the 
most "realistic" scenario would be something like this: Leftycerberus's dual-
organ system has evolved in order to provide the organism with a "back-
up" in case one of its organs of maintenance runs into trouble. Then switch-
ing off might be common; when one becomes tired, the other picks up speed 
and wins all duels for awhile. 
What would van Inwagen say about such a creature? To be consistent 
with what he says about Neocerberus, it would seem that he must say 
something like this: whenever one organ of maintenance is, for a time, the 
sole cause of the changes it tries to direct, then it cannot give up any of its 
control to the other organ of maintenance without one Life coming to an 
end and a new one beginning. To pass on control would be to produce a 
Life with "different causes." But how plausible is that? Control of my 
heart rate can be taken over by a pacemaker without my ceasing to be. 
Why couldn't Leftycerberus's heart rate alone, say, be taken over by its 
right organ of maintenance without the poor thing's ceasing to be? For 
that matter, couldn't I survive the artificial control, at least for a short time, 
of all sorts of bodily functions - the systolic being only the most obvious 
example? If so, why couldn't the left organ pass some or even all of its 
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duties to the right organ for a while? There seems no reason to deny that 
an organism such as Leftycerberus could survive such shifting of control. 
Only a desperate resolve to save the only x and y principle at any cost 
could motivate such a denial. 
But if van Inwagen were to allow the possibility of a Leftycerberus, he 
would have to admit that such a creature could survive the removal of one 
of its organs of maintenance. Suppose the left organ has passed on its 
duties to the right. Then we remove the left organ, leaving the right one to 
carry on by itself. Leftycerberus's Life need not come to an end, at least not 
for the reason van Inwagen originally gave - that is, because the post-op 
Life now being directed by the right organ has different causes. Removing 
the left organ doesn't change the causes of the Life that's going on in this 
situation. So Leftycerberus can survive the destruction of one organ of 
maintenance and (van Inwagen has already allowed) the destruction of the 
corresponding brain. Suppose it's the left organ of maintenance and brain 
1 that are destroyed. In that case, there's a Life which involves both of 
these for a time (along with brain 2 and the right organ), and then is contin-
ued by brain 2 and the right organ on their own. Call this process "Life 1." 
Now what happens in true fission? What happens if brain 1 and the left 
organ are removed not by destruction, but by their breaking away to con-
stitute a mirror-image organism? I have argued elsewhere that the materi-
alist who eschews temporal parts has no choice but to regard a perfectly 
symmetrical fission as the end of the original individual;14 and van 
Inwagen seems to agree. So Leftycerberus can't survive this episode. And 
yet, the process I called "Life 1" is still there, just as it was before - or at 
least, a process intrinsically just like Life 1, involving all the same particles 
doing all the same things. This process was, in the absence of competitors, 
sufficient for Neocerberus's survival. But, when a competitor is present, it 
is not. And so, to retain its plausibility, van Inwagen's account of organism 
identity is forced into the denial of the only x and y principle. 
I am convinced that any materialism concerning human beings that 
eschews temporal parts can be driven in similar fashion toward a closest 
continuer account of human persistence conditions. Such materialists can-
not avoid saying that, if there are two simultaneously existing and equally 
good candidates for being involved in the same Life as some earlier person; 
then the original person ceases to exist, her Life ends, and two new Lives 
begin. But if one of the two candidates had been completely absent 
(destroyed at the point of fission instead of being preserved alive), then the 
original Life would have continued and the original person would have 
persisted through the loss of half her brain. 
I shall shortly need a little more information about how to trace Lives 
through branchings. The principle I will appeal to is this: If you are look-
ing for the next event in a given Life, and the present event is causally con-
nected in the appropriate, immanent way to two nonsimultaneous later 
events, but one is earlier than the other, go to the earlier of the two - it is 
the earlier one that represents the continuation of this Life, and the subse-
quent appearance of the later one does not tum this into a case of fission. I 
shall be assuming, then, something like a "temporally-closest continuer" 
theory of persistence conditions. 
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3. Lives with spatiotemporal gaps 
Suppose that van Inwagen's notion of a Life does constitute the proper 
way to trace the careers of human beings; and that, when there is branching, 
it is the temporally-closest branch (if there is one) that continues the original 
Life. I think we can still make sense of an afterlife without having to suppose 
that God is a secret body-snatcher - someone who invisibly removes bodies 
or body-parts at death, replacing them with lookalikes. Here's one way: 
On van Inwagen's view of human persistence, as on many others that 
emphasize a causal component in personal identity, if someone has persist-
ed into the present, then his existence in the immediate past must not be 
causally irrelevant to his having lasted until now. For instance, the fact 
that I am presently standing here must be at least partly causally explicable 
in terms of the fact that I was standing here a moment ago; for if the body 
standing here then had no causal connections with the body here now, 
then the latter is not a continuation of the old one but a replacement that 
just happens to resemble the old one a good deal. This follows from van 
Inwagen's thesis that Lives are self-sustaining events; but it is often 
advanced as part of a larger metaphysical thesis, one that is sometimes put 
in this way: it is necessary that the stages of a single individual thing (ani-
mate or inanimate) be connected by "immanent causality. illS 
The role of immanent-causal relations among the stages of a persisting 
thing is most often discussed within the context of a metaphysics of tempo-
ral parts. David Armstrong, for instance, notes that "preceding phases of a 
thing are a necessary part of the total cause which brings the succeeding 
phases to be."'6 For Armstrong, the "phases" in question are temporal 
parts; but one may emphasize the importance of immanent causation with-
out accepting the doctrine of temporal parts. This can be seen most clearly 
by considering different views about the nature of causal relata. Let us 
assume, for simplicity, that conditions, states, and events together consti-
tute one big category of causal relata, all of which may - with some 
stretching of ordinary usage - be called "events". It is generally agreed 
that objects only enter into causal relations derivatively by having causally 
efficacious events happen to them. For instance, the baseball's breaking 
the window is really a matter of a set of events C causing another event e 
- where C will include the event of the baseball's hitting the window with 
such-and-such a velocity, the "event" of the window's being made of a cer-
tain kind of glass, etc., and e is the window's breaking. 
Although Armstrong's way of describing immanent causation seems to 
presuppose a theory of events according to which (at least some) events are 
temporal parts, surely it is possible to agree with Armstrong about the impor-
tance of causal connections in persistence conditions while withholding com-
mitment to a metaphysics of temporal parts.'? The target thesis about imma-
nent causation can be put in metaphysically neutral terms. First, we define 
"temporal stage of an object" as a kind of complex, comprehensive event: 
(Dl) s is the temporal stage at t of an object x =df there is a set R of all 
the intrinsic properties x has at t, and s is the event of x's exempli-
fying R at t. 
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If a property-exemplification theory of events is correct, then temporal 
stages as defined by (D1) are not temporal parts. 18 But if some of the friends 
of temporal parts are correct, then such comprehensive exemplifications of 
properties may in fact be identified with the temporal parts of things; in 
which case temporal stages are temporal parts. However this dispute about 
the correct theory of events hlms out, (D1) can be used without prejudice to 
either view to express Annstrong's thesis about immanent causation. 
Formulating a more precise statement of Armstrong's claim about 
immanent causation is complicated by the fact that, since time is a continu-
um, for any momentary stage which has previous stages among its partial 
causes, there is no single previous stage. What one should say, I think, is 
that, for an object that persists throughout a given period of time, the way 
the object is at any moment in that interval must be partially detennined 
by the way it was during the interval leading up to that moment. This 
yields the following sort of principle: 
(IC) Necessarily, if a physical object x persists throughout an open tempo-
ral interval T, then for every instant tinT there is an open interval of 
time T* with t as its point-limit such that the sum of x's temporal 
stages that exist during T* is a partial cause of x's temporal stage at t.I" 
Many metaphysicians seem to agree that something like (IC) must be 
true, and that immanent-causal relations among stages are much more cen-
tral to the persistence conditions of physical objects than relations of spa-
tiotemporal contiguity among stages.2() Furthermore, the notion that spa-
tiotemporal continuity of stages is not even necessary for persistence is a 
natural enough view. Why suppose that things cannot jump discontinu-
ously from one place to another, or flicker out of existence for a while only 
to re-emerge elsewhere and elsewhen?21 Annstrong sums up the relation-
ship between spatiotemporal continuity and immanent causation succinct-
ly: "Spatiotemporal continuity of phases of things appears to be a mere 
result of, an observable sign of, the existence of a certain sort of causal rela-
tion between the phases. "22 
(IC) does not rule out the possibility of discontinuous spatiotemporal 
jumps for objects, or even of "temporally gappy" objects; it merely 
describes a condition that applies to periods of time throughout which an 
object exists. If immanent-causal connections are indeed necessary for per-
sistence, then if it is possible for an object to persist through temporal gaps 
during which it has no stages, there must be suitable immanent-causal 
relations which cross the temporal gap between earlier and later stages. 
The statement of a more general condition allowing for this possibility is 
complicated, once again, by the fact that (time being continuous) an inter-
mittently existing thing would seem capable of having an "existence gap" 
that is either open or closed on both ends, or else open on one end and 
closed on the other." In the case of a thing x that goes out of existence for 
an open interval T between t and t*, we should say that it is a necessary 
condition of x's persistence over this gap that x's temporal stage at t is a 
partial cause of x's temporal stage at t*. And we should add that at no time 
during the gap is there a set of conditions sufficient by itself for the occur-
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rence of x's temporal stage at t*. To allow that would be to allow that 
immanent-causal connections could pass through the circuitry of the 
Enterprise's transporter or the mind of God; and, on van Inwagen's account 
of Lives, such causal connections are not sufficiently "immanent" to pre-
serve sameness of Life (and, with it, sameness of living body). Similar con-
ditions may be formulated for the three other sorts of existence-gaps. 
Assuming, then, that the kind of immanent-causal connections that nor-
mally preserve a Life could cross spatial and temporal gaps, there's no rea-
son to think that one and the same Life could not contain spatial jumps or 
temporal gaps. As long as the causal processes from earlier stages to later 
stages are of the right sort, preserving the self-sustaining structure peculiar 
to the living thing in question, one has the same Life. If, for instance, every 
particle in my body were disposed at a given time to (discontinuously) 
"jump" precisely one yard in a certain direction, then my body would sus-
tain itself over a discontinuous jump of one yard as well. 
Of course the supposition that causal processes can be spatiotemporally 
gappy in this way is contentious. But it should be much less so than it once 
was, for the following reasons: there is no a priori reason to think it is 
impossible, and some a posteriori reason to think it happens; the theories 
of causation which imply that it is impossible have been exploded; and the 
most promising theories still in the water can accommodate it. I can give 
only the briefest survey of these points here. 
One species of gappy causal process is what Russell called "mnemic 
causation" - "that kind of causation ... in which the proximate cause con-
sists not merely of a present event, but of this together with a past event."" 
He concludes that there is "no a priori objection to a causal law in which 
part of the cause has ceased to exist."'s But what are the supposed a priori 
objections to causally direct action at a spatial or temporal distance? The 
traditional one was just that "a thing cannot act where it is not"; and so an 
event cannot cease to be before its effect comes into existence or directly 
bring about an effect at some spatial distance. But this line of reasoning 
quickly leads to the conclusion that all causation must be simultaneous, 
and that a cause and its effect must occupy the very same spot - and how, 
then, is the propagation of causal processes possible? This result consti-
tutes a near reductio of the primary source of the a priori objections to 
mnemic and otherwise gappy causation. 
On the a posteriori side in favor of direct causation across spatiotempo-
ral gaps, there is Bell's inequality, verified by Aspect's experiments, which 
suggests that either there is faster-than-light signaling at the quantum 
level, or else there are nonlocal causal influences at work. Of course I can-
not pretend to know how the paradoxes of quantum mechanics will ulti-
mately be resolved (if indeed they ever will be, to everyone's satisfaction). 
But all I wish to point out here is this: nonlocal causal processes are a seri-
ous contender for explaining certain very mysterious physical phenomena; 
and many of those who have thought hardest about these matters take the 
possibility seriously. Unless we metaphysicians have some very powerful 
a priori arguments against gappy causal processes (and, as I said, I think 
we don't), we had better stop insisting that they're impossible. 
True, some philosophical theories about the nature of causation straight-
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forwardly imply that cause and effect must be at least spatiotemporally 
contiguous, if not coincident. Most notably, contiguity of cause and effect 
is built into the theories of Hume and C.]. Ducasse. But, by my lights, the 
critics of these views have won: causation is more than just constant con-
junction and spatiotemporal contiguity; and the cause of a given effect can-
not be defined in Ducasse's way, either - as, roughly, the sole change 
occurring right before the effect and in its immediate environment.26 What 
theories of causation are still afloat? There is a bewildering variety, but 
most of the real contenders have room for gappy causal processes. There 
are purely singularist accounts, like Elizabeth Anscombe's,27 that simply 
take the causal relation as fundamental and unanalyzeable; given the sim-
plicity of the causal relation on such a view, the impossibility of causation 
over gaps could hardly follow from the thesis. There are counterfactual 
analyses, like David Lewis's;28 and nothing in such accounts prohibits 
counterfactual dependencies of the right sort between events that (a) have 
spatiotemporal gaps between them, and (b) have no other events between 
them capable of taking up the causal slack. A number of theories posit 
some sort of intrinsically causal persisting process or thing as a primitive 
notion, and use it in the analysis of causal relations among events. Wesley 
Salmon, for instance, takes" causal processes" as basic - causal processes 
being spread out in space-time, and (unlike mere "pseudo-processes") 
capable of transmitting signals or bearing a mark.29 Most recently, Douglas 
Ehring has suggested that the "singularist element" that links a cause to an 
effect is the persistence of a "trope," a property-instance that is part of the 
cause and endures as part of the effect.30 Like the simpler singularism of 
Anscombe, theories like Salmon's and Ehring's cannot in any straightfor-
ward way imply the spatiotemporal continuity of causal processes, or the 
contiguity of cause and effect. Since the notion of a causal process or a per-
sisting trope is taken as a primitive, there can be no analytic requirement 
that such things exhibit spatiotemporal continuity. 
These are, in brief, the reasons it seems to me to be sensible to suppose 
that nmemic or otherwise gappy causation is possible. And given that it's 
possible, then, whatever the likelihood of its occurrence in the ordinary 
course of nature, gappy causation remains a tool that God might use to 
effect the preservation of this living body. Is such causation necessary in 
order for God to secure my body's survival without body-snatching? 
Perhaps not; for, in the final section, I shall suggest that, even if there be 
some sort of hidden impossibility here, there remains a less problematic 
sort of "quasi-causal" dependence that could cross spatiotemporal gaps 
and be used by God to insure my survival. 
If we can make sense of immanent-causal connections over spatiotempo-
ral gaps, then we are well on our way to an account of survival without 
body-snatching. Suppose my body were to undergo an extraordinary and 
discontinuous case of fission: every particle in my body at a certain time t is 
immanent-causally connected with two resulting particle-stages after that 
time. The two sets of resulting particles appear at some later time t* in dis-
joint spatial regions, and each is arranged just as the set of "parent" particles 
that produced it; what's more, they are so arranged because the original parti-
cles were so arranged - for each particle produces its "offspring" at precise-
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ly the same distances and directions as every other particle, insuring duplica-
tion of my body's overall structure. My body, in this case, replicates itself 
over a temporal gap. Given the solution to fission cases advocated above, 
we must say that this event brings my life to an end. But now suppose that 
the same sort of fissioning of each particle occurs, but that only one set consti-
tutes at t* a living human body structured just like mine; the other set 
appears at t* as an unstructured pile of dead matter. Perhaps many of the 
particles failed to "send" one set of "offspring" to the right place, so that the 
particles that appear on one side are not arranged just like the original set of 
particles. Then, thanks to the failure of one body to "take," my life is contin-
ued by the successful candidate that appears after a temporal interval. 
Now we have a model for how God may resurrect this very body: He 
does so by, just before it completely loses its living form, enabling each par-
ticle to divide - or at least to be immanent-causally responsible for two 
resulting particle-stages. One of the resulting particle-stages is right here, 
where the old one was; another is either in heaven now (for immediate res-
urrectionists), or somewhere in the far future. But in any case, since the set 
of particle-stages on earth that are immanent-causally connected with my 
dying body do not participate in a Life, there is no danger of my "fission-
ing out of existence" due to competition with my corpse. My corpse is not 
even a candidate for being me, since it does not participate in a Life. In fact, 
on van lnwagen's view, there is no such object - it's just a collection of 
particles that doesn't add up to anything. But whether or not the corpse is 
a single thing, it could not be identical with the living organism that was 
here just prior to my death, since organisms are essentially living things. 
Furthermore, if the ultimate simples in my body are the kinds of things 
that can last through time (some talk as though quantum mechanics rules 
this out), it will tum out that each simple which God "zaps" with this repli-
cating power in fact does not itself divide, but simply remains right here -
as a part of my corpse. Each particle x is immanent-causally connected to 
two streams of later particle-stages; one of them - the one in the here and 
now - includes stages of x itself; the other, the one in the hereafter, con-
sists of stages of a different particle. Unlike a case of fission in which the 
fission-products co-exist, the case of the future-replicating individual parti-
cle involves only one resultant particle now; so, in the present there is no 
other candidate to threaten the continued existence of the original particle 
- there is only one "temporally-closest continuer" for each particle. 
The diversity of the particles I'll have after death from the particles in 
my dying body does not, however, prevent the bodies from being the same. 
All that matters for the continuation of my Life is that the right kind of life-
sustaining causal continuity obtain among person-stages. In fact, if I'm 
made entirely of particles that are bosons or fermions (as seems to be the 
case), then there is reason to doubt whether my body can ever be said, 
strictly speaking, to consist of the same particles from one moment to the 
next. For fermions and bosons obey statistical laws which lead many to 
say that they "lack individuality."31 But whether or not the ultimate sim-
ples in my body persist, the atoms and molecules in my body as I die will 
all still be here, heaped up on the floor as parts of my corpse. For the 
causal relations normally sufficient to preserve atoms and molecules will 
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obtain between the pre- and post-death atoms and molecules; and, as long 
as the only competitor for being this or that molecule is something that 
appears in the future, there are no competitors here and now. 
Thus we have a story that includes everything we want: The heap of 
dead matter I leave behind is made of stuff which really was a part of my 
body (it is not a simulacrum; God is not a body-snatcher), and the resur-
rected body is really identical with this present one - it is causally contin-
uous with it in just the way adjoining stages of my present body are causal-
ly continuous, except that in this case there is a spatial or spatiotemporal 
gap which my poor body was given the power to cross by means of God's 
intervention. 
4. Objections and replies 
Objection: What if God had given my particles this replicating power 
back at the end of my 20th year, so that at that time they were immanent-
causally connected both with a living duplicate in the hereafter as well as 
with succeeding spatiotemporally continuous 21-year-old body-stages in 
the here-and-now? 
Reply: I answer just as in the particle case. Since there is no rival candi-
date for me in existence immediately after the last 20-year-old person-
stage, my life continues in the ordinary way - the ostensibly 20-year old 
"resurrected" replica of me is just that, a replica of "the me that used to 
be." One only faces fission when a life divides into two co-existing (and 
therefore competing) streams. 
Objection:'2 If my body reappears exactly as it was right before my 
death, then the first thing I will do when I get to heaven is die. And that's 
not much to look forward to! 
Reply: The simplest response is to point out that, right up to the 
moment of my death, it remains possible for God to miraculously heal my 
body, preserving my life by fixing an organ that isn't functioning, kick-
starting a process that has stopped, or holding together bits of me that are 
flying apart. As long as His miraculous interference is not too extreme 
(not, for instance, the instantaneous replacement of every cell in my body 
with a new cell specially created on the spot), He would be healing my body 
and not just replacing it with a simulacrum. If He could have worked such 
a miracle at any point up to the moment of my death, then He could surely 
do it as soon as my body reappears - so quickly, in fact, that neither I nor 
any other (normal human) witness would notice that my body was, for a 
moment, in bad shape. But there are sure to be other ways around this 
problem; for instance, the extraordinary causal powers given to the parti-
cles of my dying body could be tampered with slightly, so that some of 
their results in the hereafter are not precisely what one would have expect-
ed given their organization at my death. 
Objection: You have spoken blithely of God "zapping" material parti-
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cles to give them replicating power; but I suspect there is a deep impossi-
bility lurking here. On my view, it is essential to an object that it have all of 
the most fundamental causal powers it actually has, and no more. But then 
the replicating power you posit could not be foisted on a thing from "out-
side" - to do so would be to violate its very nature. 
Reply: Although I am suspicious of your rigid theory of causal powers, 
I can respond to your objection without denying your theory. Particles in 
the here-and-now can mnemically-cause - or at least mnemically-"quasi-
cause" - particles in my resurrected body without the introduction of for-
eign powers. The chief difficulty to be avoided in a materialist theory of 
survival is the severing of direct causal dependence between the heavenly 
person-stages and the dying person-stages. If the body appearing in the 
hereafter is the way it is not primarily because of the way my body was at 
death, but as a direct result of God's creative act, then the required imma-
nent-causal connection is broken. The important question here is whether, 
at the time of resurrection, there are causally sufficient conditions in exis-
tence for the appearance of a body of precisely this sort; or whether the 
causally sufficient conditions must be extended back to include the state of 
my body at death. Tn the former case, survival is in jeopardy. But in the 
latter case, the falling elevator model is off the hook. 
Fortunately, it is fairly easy to see how God could issue a decree that 
would produce a body just like mine was at my death, without at the same 
time precisely determining the characteristics of the body that appears. 
God's part in resurrecting me - His decree - could be extremely limited 
in its content. If his decree is appropriately limited, the particular structure 
exemplified by the resurrected body will depend directly upon a past exis-
tent: Namely, the temporal stage of my body at the time of my death. 
I propose that we think of God's creative acts on the order of the carry-
ing out of a king's commands. There are, of course, big differences. A king 
has authority to issue decrees; but his orders (at least the significant ones) 
can only be carried out by means of causal intermediaries, whereas God 
need only give the command and it is so. Still, the comparison proves illu-
minating. Consider Frederick the Great, issuing one of his whimsical 
decrees: "Let the tallest man in the kingdom be brought before me!" And 
his messengers scour the kingdom measuring people, in search of a man 
taller than all the others. Assuming there are not two or more equally tall 
men taller than all others, there is a certain state of affairs that would repre-
sent the fulfillment of Frederick's decree. If Jones happens to be the tallest 
man in the kingdom, it is: Jones's standing before the king. But if 
Robinson had been an inch taller, or Jones an inch shorter, a different state 
of affairs would have satisfied the king's order. Clearly, the result of the 
king's command in this case depends on more than just its content; it also 
depends upon facts about the heights of the men in his kingdom. 
Now suppose God's command at the general resurrection is limited in 
something like the way Frederick's "Find the tallest man" is limited. 
Suppose God says: "Let there be a body which is just like Zimmerman's 
was at his death." The precise nature of the body that appears will not be 
determined by the content of God's decree - or by any other set of condi-
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tions that exist then.33 There is no blueprint in God's mind specifying my 
body's former states, a blueprint that figures in his act of creation. Rather, 
the nature of the body depends entirely upon what my final bodily stage 
was like. This seems to me to represent, if not genuine mnemic causation, 
at least a kind of mnemic quasi-causal dependence. In particular, it is, I 
believe, sufficient to address van Inwagen's worry that the particles in any 
ostensibly resurrected body "will occupy the positions relative to one 
another they occupy because of God's miracle and not because of the oper-
ation of the natural processes that, taken collectively, were the life of that 
man." What the new body is actually like in its details depends upon what 
the original body was like, and not upon the will of God - at least not 
upon the particular act of will that is involved in this particular miracle. 
The bite of van Inwagen's original dilemma comes from our feeling that 
a body put together in such a way that its every feature depends entirely 
upon God's action at the time he creates it could only be a replica of me. 
But the details of the body that results from the very limited divine decree 
I've described would not depend upon the particular activity God engaged 
in then; they would depend instead upon the states of my body at death. 
The fact that the dependence in question is not ordinary causal depen-
dence is, I think, beside the point - what's needed is simply a way for the 
intrinsic states of the heavenly body to depend upon those of the earlier 
one directly, that is, without passing through intermediate conditions suffi-
cient themselves to explain the heavenly body's structure. And this has 
been done. There is no causal process that passes outside every living 
human body and provides a sufficient explanation for the heavenly body's 
existence and intrinsic nature. The chain of dependence (in this case, 
quasi-causal dependence) going backwards from the initial state of the 
heavenly body remains "immanent" with respect to a living, human 
organism - namely, my body.34 
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